Information aggregation in common value auctions

被引：40

|

作者：

Kremer, I

机构：

[1] Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2002年 / 70卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.00346

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

收藏

页码：1675 / 1682

页数：8

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