Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government, the public, and public officials

被引:8
|
作者
Zheng, Yan [1 ]
Liao, Xiaoming [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanchang Univ, Sch Management, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
[2] Nanchang Univ, Sch Publ Adm, Nanchang 330031, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家社会科学基金;
关键词
Public officials; corruption; evolutionary game theory; dynamic stability; China; IMPACT; PRESS;
D O I
10.1080/00036846.2019.1613508
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The current state of corruption in China is still worrisome. Corruption among public officials depends not only on their subjective will, but also on the success rate of government investigations and public whistleblowing. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, the people, and public officials and solves the dynamic model. The authors also provide a numerical simulation of the proposed model to confirm theoretical predictions. The results reveal that when the government's success rate reaches a certain threshold, public officials will trend to a strategy of no bribery, and at this threshold, raising the cost of bribing public officials can quickly prevent them from corruption. At the equilibrium, the public will trend toward a strategy of no whistleblowing. The findings of this study are of great significance to the current anti-corruption debate in China.
引用
收藏
页码:5411 / 5419
页数:9
相关论文
共 31 条
  • [1] Research on platform data security governance strategy based on three-party evolutionary game
    Tian, Zhen
    Han, Meng
    Jiang, Chuchu
    [J]. HELIYON, 2024, 10 (17)
  • [2] Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government
    Ye, Xincai
    Miao, Lin
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND END USER COMPUTING, 2022, 34 (08)
  • [3] Modeling Three-Party Interactional Risks in the Governance of Public-Private Partnerships
    Khallaf, Rana
    Naderpajouh, Nader
    Hastak, Makarand
    [J]. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING, 2018, 34 (06)
  • [4] Democracy and private property: Governance of a three-party public-private partnership
    Collin S.-O.Y.
    Smith E.
    [J]. Public Organization Review, 2008, 8 (1) : 53 - 68
  • [5] Three-party evolutionary game-based analysis and stability enhancement of improved PBFT consensus mechanism
    Wang, Feifan
    Liang, Nuojing
    Wu, Faguo
    Zhou, Bo
    Nie, Jiawei
    Zhang, Xiao
    [J]. CLUSTER COMPUTING-THE JOURNAL OF NETWORKS SOFTWARE TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS, 2024, 27 (09): : 12283 - 12309
  • [6] Analysis of Digital Security Governance under the Objectives of Digital Ecology: A Three-Party Evolutionary Game Approach
    Tian, Zhen
    Jiang, Chuchu
    Yue, Gangyi
    [J]. COMPLEXITY, 2024, 2024
  • [7] Three-Party Conflict and Its Evolutionary Game Analysis in Indoor Renovation of Old Residential Quarters
    Ma, Shichang
    Yilidaer, Yilifeina
    [J]. ICCREM 2021: CHALLENGES OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY UNDER THE PANDEMIC, 2021, : 543 - 553
  • [8] Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Based on Blockchain Technology
    Zhu, Qingfeng
    Zong, Rui
    Xu, Mengqi
    [J]. SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (04)
  • [9] Dynamic multimedia pricing scheme based on three-party Stackelberg game in Internet of vehicles
    Zhang, Haibo
    Wang, Xinyue
    Wang, Dongyu
    Liu, Fu
    [J]. Zhejiang Daxue Xuebao (Gongxue Ban)/Journal of Zhejiang University (Engineering Science), 2024, 58 (09): : 1781 - 1789
  • [10] Design of Dynamic Tactical Control Range in Air Combat based on Three-Party Game
    Gao, Weinan
    Yang, Zhen
    Huang, Jichuan
    Chai, Shiyuan
    Zhou, Deyun
    [J]. 2023 35TH CHINESE CONTROL AND DECISION CONFERENCE, CCDC, 2023, : 3946 - 3951