Research on Decision-Making Based on the Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Tourists, Scenic Spots, and Government

被引:7
|
作者
Ye, Xincai [1 ]
Miao, Lin [2 ]
机构
[1] Huaqiao Univ, Quanzhou, Peoples R China
[2] Liming Vocat Univ, Quanzhou, Peoples R China
关键词
Evolutionary Game; Government Regulation; NetLogo Simulation; Reward and Punishment Mechanism; Scenic Spot Quality and Service; STAKEHOLDERS; OPTIMIZATION; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.4018/JOEUC.315315
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The continuous upsurge of tourism consumption activities has promoted economic development, but at the same time, it has also produced numerous problems, such as low-quality service and high admission prices at scenic spots, which are not conducive to the sustainable development of tourism. In this paper, in view of the phenomenon of low-quality service of scenic spots, a three-party evolutionary game model of scenic spots, tourists, and government is constructed under the participation of tourists and the reward-subsidy mechanism and punishment mechanism, and a simulation analysis is performed using the NetLogo platform. The results show that, under the reward-subsidy and punishment mechanisms, the service strategy selection of scenic spots will eventually evolve to provide high-quality services, tourists will eventually choose the no-complaint strategy, and the government will eventually evolve to provide active supervision.
引用
收藏
页数:1
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Research on Green Development Decision Making of Logistics Enterprises Based on Three-Party Game
    He, Chan
    Xu, Xu
    [J]. SUSTAINABILITY, 2024, 16 (07)
  • [2] Research on platform data security governance strategy based on three-party evolutionary game
    Tian, Zhen
    Han, Meng
    Jiang, Chuchu
    [J]. HELIYON, 2024, 10 (17)
  • [3] Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government, the public, and public officials
    Zheng, Yan
    Liao, Xiaoming
    [J]. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2019, 51 (49) : 5411 - 5419
  • [4] Evolutionary Game on Government Regulation and Green Supply Chain Decision-Making
    Xu, Jiayang
    Cao, Jian
    Wang, Yunfei
    Shi, Xiangrong
    Zeng, Jiayun
    [J]. ENERGIES, 2020, 13 (03)
  • [5] Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model of Stakeholders in Mobile Crowdsourcing
    Li, Fuxing
    Wang, Yingjie
    Gao, Yang
    Tong, Xiangrong
    Jiang, Nan
    Cai, Zhipeng
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS, 2022, 9 (04) : 974 - 985
  • [6] Three-party Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Emergency Rescue
    Tang, Tingwei
    Zhu, Changfeng
    [J]. IAENG International Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2022, 52 (04)
  • [7] Research on the user comprehensive energy consumption decision-making method based on the evolutionary game
    Zhu, Xian Feng
    Yao, Jun Wei
    Xie, Qiong Yao
    Dai, Lu
    Yang, Chu Yuan
    Wang, Hai Liang
    He, Qi
    Deng, Ling
    Shen, Ran
    Zhou, Xiao Xia
    [J]. FRONTIERS IN ENERGY RESEARCH, 2022, 10
  • [8] University teachers' scientific research innovation incentive based on the three-party evolutionary game of the state, the colleges, and scientific researchers
    Zheng, Yan
    [J]. FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY, 2023, 13
  • [9] Three-Party Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Finance Based on Blockchain Technology
    Zhu, Qingfeng
    Zong, Rui
    Xu, Mengqi
    [J]. SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (04)
  • [10] Research on distribution strategy of logistics enterprise alliance based on three-party evolution game
    Ran, Wenxue
    He, Dandan
    Li, Zhaoxia
    Xue, Yun
    He, Zhenzhen
    Gunarathnage, Aravinda Dananjaya Basnayaka Basnayaka
    [J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 2024, 14 (01):