(De)Centralization and voter turnout: theory and evidence from German municipalities

被引:14
|
作者
Michelsen, Claus [1 ]
Boenisch, Peter [1 ,2 ]
Geys, Benny [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Halle Inst Econ Res, Dept Urban Econ, D-06017 Halle, Saale, Germany
[2] Univ Halle Wittenberg, Sch Econ & Business, Fac Law & Econ, D-06108 Halle, Saale, Germany
[3] Vrije Univ Brussel, Dept Appl Econ, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[4] Norwegian Business Sch BI, Dept Econ, N-0442 Oslo, Norway
关键词
Voter turnout; Institutions; Federalism; Paradox of voting; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; ELECTIONS; CLOSENESS; PARTICIPATION; PROPORTIONS; REGRESSION; PARADOX; RATES;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-013-0061-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections (e.g., compulsory voting, electoral system, postal or Sunday voting). In this article, we exploit a simple Downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision-and, in particular, the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels-likewise affects voters' turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting. Empirically, we exploit the institutional variation across German municipalities to test this proposition, and find supportive evidence.
引用
收藏
页码:469 / 483
页数:15
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