Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals: An evolutionary game theoretical approach

被引:0
|
作者
Muto, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Tokyo Inst Technol, Grad Sch Decis Sci & Technol, 2-12-1 Oookayama, Tokyo 1528550, Japan
关键词
prisoner's dilemma; altruistic parameter; payoff and utility; best-reply dynamic;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
O1 [数学]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ; 0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the set of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.
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页码:89 / 104
页数:16
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