Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt

被引：85

作者：

Liu, Yixin ^{[1
]}

Mauer, David C. ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Yilei ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ New Hampshire, Peter T Paul Coll Business & Econ, Durham, NH 03824 USA

[2] Univ Iowa, Dept Finance, Tipple Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA

[3] Univ N Dakota, Dept Finance, Coll Business & Publ Adm, Grand Forks, ND 58202 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE | 2014年 / 42卷

关键词：

Cash holdings; Inside debt; Pension; Deferred compensation; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS; MATURITY STRUCTURE; INVESTMENT; SENSITIVITIES; COMPENSATION; DETERMINANTS; OWNERSHIP; LEVERAGE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.031

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on firm cash holdings and the value of cash. We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. This positive effect is magnified by firm leverage and mitigated by the presence of financial constraints. We further find that the marginal value of cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. Our evidence supports the view that inside debt tilts managerial incentives toward bondholders and helps balance the competing interests of stockholders and bondholders. The evidence also suggests, however, that inside debt can harm shareholder value by encouraging excess cash holdings. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：83 / 100

页数：18

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