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Evaluating big deal journal bundles
被引：81
|作者：
Bergstrom, Theodore C.
[1
]
Courant, Paul N.
[2
,3
]
McAfee, R. Preston
[4
]
Williams, Michael A.
[5
]
机构：
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93105 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Gerald Ford Sch Publ Policy, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[3] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[4] Google, Strateg Technol, Mountain View, CA 94043 USA
[5] Competit Econ LLC, Emeryville, CA 94608 USA
来源：
关键词：
monopoly;
bargaining;
all-or-nothing price;
efficiency;
information technology;
D O I：
10.1073/pnas.1403006111
中图分类号：
O [数理科学和化学];
P [天文学、地球科学];
Q [生物科学];
N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号：
07 ;
0710 ;
09 ;
摘要：
Large commercial publishers sell bundled online subscriptions to their entire list of academic journals at prices significantly lower than the sum of their la carte prices. Bundle prices differ drastically between institutions, but they are not publicly posted. The data that we have collected enable us to compare the bundle prices charged by commercial publishers with those of nonprofit societies and to examine the types of price discrimination practiced by commercial and nonprofit journal publishers. This information is of interest to economists who study monopolist pricing, librarians interested in making efficient use of library budgets, and scholars who are interested in the availability of the work that they publish.
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页码：9425 / 9430
页数：6
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