Is social licence a response to government and market failures? Evidence from the literature

被引:19
|
作者
Dumbrell, Nikki P. [1 ]
Adamson, David [1 ]
Wheeler, Sarah Ann [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Adelaide, Ctr Global Food & Resources, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
关键词
Externalities; Social welfare; Welfare economics; Social acceptance; Natural resource management; Systematic literature review; NEW-SOUTH-WALES; HUMAN-RIGHTS; NATURAL-RESOURCES; HYBRID GOVERNANCE; DECISION-MAKING; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; GAS DEVELOPMENT; PUBLIC-OPINION; MINING SECTOR; OPERATE;
D O I
10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101827
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
The term 'social licence to operate', introduced in the 1990s, has increasingly been used to describe the social and environmental standards for firms to meet. Formally, a firm with a social licence is said to enjoy (intangible) ongoing acceptance or approval by communities and other stakeholders that: (1) are affected by the firm and/or their activities; and (2) can influence the profitability of the firm. While the mining industry was the first to identify the need to obtain a social licence to operate, other sectors also recognise its importance. Growth in the frequency and breadth of the terms use has contributed to a substantial body of research. A focus of this research has been the benefits and costs experienced by affected stakeholders as a result of a firm's activities. This suggests that social licence is, partly at least, an economic issue. We conducted a systematic review (with a final database of 651 documents) of the social licence literature to identify what conceptual themes have emerged, and discuss how these conceptual themes relate to fundamentals of welfare economics. By introducing economic perspectives, it was found that social licence concerns stem from government and market failures, namely: (1) negative externalities; (2) undersupply of/threats to public goods; and (3) use of socially valuable assets to generate private profits. We argue that classifying social licence concerns in this way brings clarity to the social licence literature.
引用
收藏
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] LARGE BANK FAILURES AND INVESTOR RISK PERCEPTIONS - EVIDENCE FROM DEBT MARKET
    FRASER, DR
    MCCORMACK, JP
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1978, 13 (03) : 527 - 532
  • [32] On the benefits from rigid labour markets: Norms, market failures, and social insurance
    Agell, J
    ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1999, 109 (453): : F143 - F164
  • [33] Can government stabilize the housing market? The evidence from South Korea
    Jang, Hanwool
    Song, Yena
    Ahn, Kwangwon
    PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS, 2020, 550
  • [34] Government size and the stability of output: evidence from emerging market economies
    Thornton, John
    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2010, 17 (08) : 733 - 736
  • [35] Can government stabilize the housing market? The evidence from South Korea
    Jang, Hanwool
    Song, Yena
    Ahn, Kwangwon
    Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2021, 550
  • [36] Market facilitation by local government and firm efficiency: Evidence from China
    Cull, Robert
    Xu, Lixin Colin
    Yang, Xi
    Zhou, Li-An
    Zhu, Tian
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2017, 42 : 460 - 480
  • [37] Does the Market Listen to the Government? Evidence from China Central Television
    Hong, Yun
    Jiang, Yanhui
    ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2020, 49 (03) : 438 - 462
  • [38] Market Response to Innovation Projects: The Evidence From the Russian Financial Market
    Rogova, Elena
    Guseva, Daria
    Tkachenko, Elena
    Rossi, Fabrizio
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 2016, : 645 - 653
  • [39] Designing property rights for water: mediating market, government, and corporation failures
    Whitford, Andrew B.
    Clark, Benjamin Y.
    POLICY SCIENCES, 2007, 40 (04) : 335 - 351
  • [40] Designing property rights for water: mediating market, government, and corporation failures
    Andrew B. Whitford
    Benjamin Y. Clark
    Policy Sciences, 2007, 40 : 335 - 351