Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency

被引:11
|
作者
Zhao, Rui R. [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Albany, Dept Econ, Albany, NY 12222 USA
关键词
renegotiation proof contracts; repeated principal-agent;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Renegotiation-proof contracts are studied in infinitely repeated principal-agent problem. Contracts satisfying a weaker notion of renegotiation-proofness always exist. The renegotiation-proof value function has a simple characterization: It is the principal's optimal value function when an appropriate lower bound is placed on the agent's expected utility. Sufficient conditions are provided for renegotiation-proof value function in finite horizon to converge to renegotiation-proof value function in infinite horizon as time goes to infinity. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:263 / 281
页数:19
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