Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

被引：15
|
作者：
Goldluecke, Susanne [1 ]
Kranz, Sebastian [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
[2] Univ Ulm, Dept Math & Econ, Inst Econ, D-89061 Ulm, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 80卷
关键词：
Renegotiation; Infinitely repeated games; Side payments; Optimal penal codes; REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA; INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES; SIDE-PAYMENTS; COLLUSION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：157 / 178
页数：22
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