The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making

被引:8
|
作者
Widgren, Mika [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Publ Choice Res Ctr Turku, CEPR, CESifo, Turku 20500, Finland
[2] Turku Sch Econ & Business Adm, Turku 20500, Finland
关键词
European integration; Council of Ministers; power; EUROPEAN-UNION; AGENDA SETTER; POWER; MODELS; SYSTEM; POLICY;
D O I
10.1093/cesifo/ifn039
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article deals with the design of voting rules in the European Union (EU) Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are examined. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the Member States, and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is that voting rules matter. This clearly explains why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations. The internal decision-making rules in the Council have substantial impact on both the national distribution of power in the Council and inter-institutional power between the EU's decision-making bodies. (JEL codes: C70, D71, D71, H77).
引用
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页码:30 / 56
页数:27
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