On truthful auction mechanism for cloud resources allocation and consumption shifting with different time slots

被引:2
|
作者
Song, Heng [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Zhu, Junwu [1 ]
Jiang, Yi [1 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Yangzhou Univ, Inst Informat Engn, Yangzhou, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Comp Technol, Key Lab Intelligent Informat Proc, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing, Peoples R China
[4] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, State Key Lab Ocean Engn, Shanghai, Peoples R China
来源
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
cloud computing; mechanism design; price curve; resources allocation; time‐ of‐ use pricing;
D O I
10.1002/cpe.6122
中图分类号
TP31 [计算机软件];
学科分类号
081202 ; 0835 ;
摘要
The flexibility and high reliability of cloud computing have generated a tremendous amount of economic benefits. With the growing demand for cloud resources, the task about how to making users' demand adaptive to the supply of cloud resources during peak and nonpeak hours becomes extremely challenging. However, most of the existing mechanisms mainly focus on the allocation of cloud resources, and ignore the balance between supply and demand of cloud resources. To improve the situation, this paper presents a combinatorial auction model for the cloud resource allocation and consumption shifting problem, and then puts forward a truthful auction mechanism with two different price curve functions, that is, staircase and continuous price curve. The proposed mechanism can effectively allocate and shift cloud resources to alleviate the pressure of cloud infrastructure during peak hours. Both the theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed mechanism guarantees desired properties including individual rationality, budget balance, truthfulness and computational efficiency. In addition, extensive simulation results also show that continuous price curve outperforms stair case price curve in terms of system efficiency and balance efficiency.
引用
收藏
页数:20
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