Strategic Scheduling of PEV Charging Load: A Non-Cooperative Game Model

In this paper. we consider a scenario of future smart residential area in smart grid integrated with plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) where a smart meter is used to collect the load consumption caused by charging behavior, then the driving pattern of PEV owner is simulated by a probabilistic model. Then we perform a real-time load-based electricity price model in order to curb the charging imp act during the time horizon of peak load, which turns this issue into a demand response problem. We assume that under the circumstances of unordered charging pattern, the inhabitants with PEVs prefer to start their charging process as soon as their arrival to house, meanwhile they wish to minimize their cost for charging personally according to the variation of charging price. Thus, we formulate this problem as a lion-cooperative game framework to illustrate the competition of PEV owners and the Nash equilibrium is solved with an intelligent iterative algorithm. Simulation results show that the proposed framework could minimize the charging fee of PEV owners and achieve the purpose of peak load shaving.