Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence

被引：11
|
作者：
Feess, Eberhard [2 ]
Wohlschlegel, Ansgar [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Dept Econ, D-52062 Aachen, Germany
[2] Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management, D-60314 Frankfurt, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 104卷 / 02期
关键词：
Deterrence; OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT; MAGNITUDE; FINES; CRIME; LAW;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Assuming that the willingness to find a potentially innocent defendant guilty is decreasing in punishments, we derive two results: Deterrence is decreasing when punishments are too high. and deterrence maximizing punishments tend to increase in the quality of legal systems. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：69 / 71
页数：3
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