Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence

被引：11
|
作者：
Feess, Eberhard [2 ]
Wohlschlegel, Ansgar [1 ]
机构：
[1] Rhein Westfal TH Aachen, Dept Econ, D-52062 Aachen, Germany
[2] Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management, D-60314 Frankfurt, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 104卷 / 02期
关键词：
Deterrence; OPTIMUM ENFORCEMENT; MAGNITUDE; FINES; CRIME; LAW;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Assuming that the willingness to find a potentially innocent defendant guilty is decreasing in punishments, we derive two results: Deterrence is decreasing when punishments are too high. and deterrence maximizing punishments tend to increase in the quality of legal systems. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：69 / 71
页数：3
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