On the equilibrium in bargaining model with arbitrator

被引：0
|
作者：
Mazalov, V. V. [1 ]
Mencher, A. E.
Tokareva, Yu. S.
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Karelian Res Center, Inst Appl Math Res, Petrozavodsk 185910, Karelia, Russia
来源：
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEMS SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL | 2009年 / 48卷 / 05期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION;
D O I：
10.1134/S1064230709050086
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
Two-person bargaining models with arbitrator are considered. The players make their offers, and the arbitrator decision is simulated by a random variable with two possible values. For this arbitration game and its modification with an opportunity to punish one of the participants, the Nash equilibrium is found.
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页码：739 / 745
页数：7
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