Setting a judicial agenda: The decision to grant en banc review in the US Courts of Appeals
被引:32
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作者:
Giles, Micheal W.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USAEmory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
Giles, Micheal W.
[1
]
Walker, Thomas G.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
Walker, Thomas G.
Zorn, Christopher
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
Zorn, Christopher
机构:
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
[2] Univ S Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208 USA
来源:
JOURNAL OF POLITICS
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2006年
/
68卷
/
04期
关键词:
D O I:
10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00475.x
中图分类号:
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号:
0302 ;
030201 ;
摘要:
Agenda setting has received only modest attention in studies of the judiciary. This reflects the limited control most courts exercise over the cases they hear. We analyze the influence of ideological and legal factors on the grant of en banc rehearing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals-one of the few instances of agenda control in the lower federal courts. Unlike previous research, we examine multiple decision points in the agenda-setting process. Our results indicate that the influence of attitudinal and legal factors varies across decision points revealing a complexity obscured in previous work. Our research underscores the importance of treating agenda setting as a process rather than as a single decision.