Quantifying the Influence of Local Load Redistribution Attack on Power Supply Adequacy

With the broader deployment of cyber technologies in electric power systems, the envisioned cyber-physical smart grid will be more vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks including local load redistribution (LR) attack which can affect the outcome of state estimation. It is crucial to evaluate the potential impact of local LR attacks on the power system adequacy in a long time span for the next-generation power grid. In this study, the local LR attack is mathematically modeled as a bilevel optimization problem. The long-term occurrence frequency of local LR attacks is represented by the power law distribution. Considering the difficulty and consequence of each attack region, probability of choosing the valid attack region is calculated. A holistic framework for incorporating the local LR attack into the conventional power system adequacy assessment is proposed. Simulations are conducted based on a modified IEEE 14-bus system. Simulation results demonstrated that the impact of local LR attacks on power system adequacy should not be neglected if such attacks occur frequently in the future.