Political determinants of central bank independence

被引:22
|
作者
Farvaque, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lille 1, MEDEE, Fac Sci Econ & Sociales, F-59655 Villeneuve Dascq, France
关键词
central bank; independence; political systems; senate; political economy;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00120-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper develops earlier studies on central bank independence (CBI) by relating it to political variables. Evidence shows that more stability-oriented societies give more independence to their central bank. Presence of a higher chamber and federalism play determinant roles in the results. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:131 / 135
页数:5
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