Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

被引:4
|
作者
Pistoresi, B. [1 ]
Salsano, F. [2 ,3 ]
Ferrari, D. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Modena & Reggio Emilia, Dept Econ, Modena, Italy
[2] Univ Milan, Dept Econ & Law, Milan, Italy
[3] Univ London, Birkbeck Coll, Dept Econ Math & Stat, London, England
关键词
DETERMINANTS;
D O I
10.1080/13504851.2010.485923
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).
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页码:679 / 682
页数:4
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