CENTRAL-BANK INDEPENDENCE REVISITED

被引：3

作者：

FISCHER, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NBER,CAMBRIDGE,MA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1995年 / 85卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：201 / 206

页数：6

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