Toward moire effective technology insertions for chemical and biological defense

The Department of Defense has a relatively well funded chemical and biological defense program, delivering a number of new technologies to the U.S. Navy and other services. However, observations from forward Fleet operations and recent Fleet battle experiments suggest that these technology insertions are not necessarily resulting in improved chemical and biological defense capabilities. It is also apparent that the Department of Defense investments are too heavily focused on past threats versus today's emerging threats. During the Cold War, the focus was on preparing operating forces to operate in a contaminated environment, a material and equipment-intensive mission. As far as fixed sites are concerned (including ships in port and at anchor), today's threat is more likely a terrorist attack, requiring those sites to have a credible first response capability. This paper advocates a more flexible approach to chemical and biological defense by the Department of the Navy, and changes to the Department of Defense investment strategy for chemical and biological defense. A number of specific recommendations are offered, most of which are executable with existing funds.