Vicarious traumas: Television and public opinion in japan's north Korea policy

Critiques of American mainstream and conservative media for their often dubious cheerleading of the US war against Iraq have become familiar elements of recent public discourse. However, such analyses have not generated equivalent intellectual engagement with media representations of North Korea. Considering how difficult it has been to obtain accurate information on North Korea, this relative paucity is surprising. I address this lacuna by analyzing the role of the Japanese media, particularly television, in generating public perceptions of North Korea. Why did Japanese television coverage of North Korea reach saturation points following the 9/17 summit? Why were audiences. so receptive? How did television shape public opinion? And how did domestic public opinion influence or constrict Japan's North Korea policy? In answering these questions, rather than simply observe that the abductions themselves have been the most important issue in Japan, or note that there have been temporary increases or decreases in Japanese media coverage of North Korea, I argue that television (and other forms of mass media) herded the public into a relatively constricted range of views through narrow, biased saturation coverage of the issue du jour. An intersection of structural concentration, content isomorphism, malleable audiences and domestic policy conflicts allowed the media not only to set agendas, but to prime the audience and frame the presentation of information. Public opinion,, maintained by conservative political lobbies, viewer ratings responses and broadcasting strategies, ultimately constricted the government policy agenda, range and choice in dealing with North Korea, generating very predictable behaviours.