Endogenous and exogenous commitment

被引：2
|
作者：
Breig, Zachary [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Qld, Australia
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 183卷
关键词：
Commitment; Mechanism design; Repeated games; Spot contracting; Renegotiation; CONTRACTS; EXPLICIT; IMPLICIT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108577
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I study a dynamic model of monopoly sales in which one long-term monopolist without exogenous commitment power interacts with a sequence of short-term consumers with private valuations. I provide a folk theorem which characterizes the payoffs of a sufficiently patient monopolist and I show that exogenous commitment power can obstruct the endogenous commitment from repeated game incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：3
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