Endogenous monetary commitment

被引：6
|
作者：
Libich, Jan [1 ]
Stehik, Petr [2 ]
机构：
[1] La Trobe Univ, Sch Business, Melbourne, Vic 3086, Australia
[2] Univ W Bohemia, Plzen 30614, Czech Republic
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 112卷 / 01期
基金：
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词：
Commitment; Endogenous timing; Asynchronous games; Strict vs.flexible inflation targeting; POLICY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.030
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop an asynchronous framework in which each player can optimally select the frequency of his moves based on cost-benefit considerations. To demonstrate how such ability to commit can alleviate coordination problems, we apply the framework to monetary policy. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：103 / 106
页数：4
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