Robust and Universal Seamless Handover Authentication in 5G HetNets

被引:79
|
作者
Zhang, Yinghui [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Deng, Robert H. [3 ]
Bertino, Elisa [4 ]
Zheng, Dong [1 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Xian Univ Posts & Telecommun, Natl Engn Lab Wireless Secur, Xian 710121, Peoples R China
[2] State Key Lab Cryptol, Beijing 100878, Peoples R China
[3] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Informat Syst, Singapore, Singapore
[4] Purdue Univ, Dept Comp Sci, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[5] Westone Cryptol Res Ctr, Beijing 100070, Peoples R China
基金
国家重点研发计划; 中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Handover; Authentication; 5G mobile communication; Servers; Blockchain; 5G; LTE; handover authentication; blockchain; chameleon hashing; BAN logic; AVISPA; EFFICIENT; SECURE; PROTOCOL; SCHEME; CONSTRUCTION; MOBILITY; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1109/TDSC.2019.2927664
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The evolving fifth generation (5G) cellular networks will be a collection of heterogeneous and backward-compatible networks. With the increased heterogeneity and densification of 5G heterogeneous networks (HetNets), it is important to ensure security and efficiency of frequent handovers in 5G wireless roaming environments. However, existing handover authentication mechanisms still have challenging issues, such as anonymity, robust traceability and universality. In this paper, we address these issues by introducing RUSH, a Robust and Universal Seamless Handover authentication protocol for 5G HetNets. In RUSH, anonymous mutual authentication with key agreement is enabled for handovers by exploiting the trapdoor collision property of chameleon hash functions and the tamper-resistance of blockchains. RUSH achieves universal handover authentication for all the diverse mobility scenarios, as exemplified by the handover between 5G new radio and non-3GPP access regardless of the trustworthiness of non-3GPP access and the consistency of the core network. RUSH also achieves perfect forward secrecy, master key forward secrecy, known randomness secrecy, key escrow freeness and robust traceability. Our formal security proofs based on the BAN-logic and formal verification based on AVISPA indicate that RUSH resists various attacks. Comprehensive performance evaluation and comparisons show that RUSH outperforms other schemes in both computation and communication efficiencies.
引用
收藏
页码:858 / 874
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Cross-Layer Authentication Protocol Design for Ultra-Dense 5G HetNets
    Moreira, Christian Miranda
    Kaddoum, Georges
    Bou-Harb, Elias
    2018 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (ICC), 2018,
  • [32] Generalized RACH-Less Handover for Seamless Mobility in 5G and Beyond Mobile Networks
    Choi, Ji-Hwan
    Shin, Dong-Joon
    IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, 2019, 8 (04) : 1264 - 1267
  • [33] Provably Secure Protocol for 5G HetNets
    Tom Mboya University College, 199-40300, Kenya
    IEEE Int. Conf. Microwaves, Antennas, Commun. Electron. Syst., COMCAS, 2021, (17-22):
  • [34] A Cross-layer Collaborative Handover Authentication Approach for 5G Heterogeneous Network
    Ma, Ting
    Hu, Feng
    2018 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, IMAGE AND SIGNAL PROCESSING, 2019, 1169
  • [35] Downlink Spectrum Allocation in 5G HetNets
    Omar, Tamer R.
    Kamal, Ahmed E.
    Chang, J. Morris
    2014 INTERNATIONAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE COMPUTING CONFERENCE (IWCMC), 2014, : 12 - 17
  • [36] A Blockchain-assisted Group Handover Authentication Protocol for 5G Wireless Networks
    Ma, Ronghao
    Zhou, Jianhong
    Ma, Maode
    20TH INTERNATIONAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS & MOBILE COMPUTING CONFERENCE, IWCMC 2024, 2024, : 78 - 83
  • [37] Provably Secure Protocol for 5G HetNets
    Nyangaresi, Vincent Omollo
    2021 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MICROWAVES, ANTENNAS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS (COMCAS), 2021, : 17 - 22
  • [38] Survey of User Association in 5G HetNets
    Ramazanali, Hawar
    Mesodiakaki, Agapi
    Vinel, Alexey
    Verikoukis, Christos
    2016 8TH IEEE LATIN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS (LATINCOM), 2016,
  • [39] What will interference be like in 5G HetNets?
    Riihijaervi, Janne
    Maehoenen, Petri
    Petrova, Marina
    PHYSICAL COMMUNICATION, 2016, 18 : 85 - 94
  • [40] Paris Metro Pricing for 5G HetNets
    Passas, Virgilios
    Miliotis, Vasileios
    Makris, Nikos
    Korakis, Thanasis
    Tassiulas, Leandros
    2016 IEEE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE (GLOBECOM), 2016,