A Framework of Camera Source Identification Bayesian Game

Image forensics with the presence of an adversary, such as the interplay between the sensor-based camera source identification (CSI) and the fingerprint-copy attack, has attracted increasing attention recently. In this paper, we propose a framework of CSI game with both complete information and incomplete information. A noise level-based counter antiforensic method is presented to detect the potential fingerprint-copy attack, and unlike the state-of-the-art countermeasure of the triangle test, it does not need to collect the candidate image set. With the existence of countermeasure, a rational forger needs to balance the tradeoff between synthesizing source information and leaving new detectable evidence of raising the noise level of a forged image. The mixed-strategy other than the sequential-move assumption is adopted to solve the games. The Bayesian game is introduced to address the information asymmetry in practice. The Nash equilibrium of both the complete information game and Bayesian game are theoretically analyzed, and the expected Nash equilibrium payoff of a Bayesian game is obtained. Nash equilibrium receiver operating characteristic curves are adopted to evaluate the detection performance. Simulation results show that the information asymmetry can remarkably affect the final detection performance. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt in analyzing a Bayesian forensic game with practical information asymmetry.