When Reputation Meets Subsidy: How to Build High Quality On Demand Service Platforms

被引：0

作者：

Fang, Zhixuan ^{[1
]}

Huang, Jianwei ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Dept Informat Engn, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

[2] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Sci & Engn, Shenzhen, Peoples R China

[3] Shenzhen Inst Artificial Intelligence & Robot Soc, Shenzhen, Peoples R China

来源：

IEEE INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS | 2020年

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

sharing economy; reputation system; network economics;

D O I：

10.1109/infocom41043.2020.9155351

中图分类号：

TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

A widely adopted approach to guarantee high-quality services on on-demand service platforms is to introduce a reputation system, where good reputation workers will receive a bonus for providing high-quality services. In this paper, we propose a general reputation framework motivated by various practical examples. Our model captures the evolution of a reputation system, jointly considering worker's strategic behaviors and imperfect customer reviews that are usually studied separately before. We characterize the stationary equilibrium of the market, in particular, the existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial equilibrium that ensures high-quality services. Furthermore, we propose an efficient subsidization mechanism that helps induce high-quality services on the platform, and show the market convergence to the high service quality equilibrium under such a mechanism.

引用

页码：944 / 953

页数：10