Quality of Diabetes Care in Blended Fee-for-Service and Blended Capitation Payment Systems

被引:8
|
作者
Bamimore, Mary Aderayo [1 ]
Devlin, Rose Anne [2 ]
Zaric, Gregory S. [1 ,3 ]
Garg, Amit X. [1 ,4 ,5 ]
Sarma, Sisira [1 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Western Ontario, Dept Epidemiol & Biostat, Kresge Bldg,Room K201, London, ON N6A 5C1, Canada
[2] Univ Ottawa, Dept Econ, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[3] Western Univ, Ivey Business Sch, London, ON, Canada
[4] Western Univ, Dept Med, London, ON, Canada
[5] Inst Clin Evaluat Sci, Toronto, ON, Canada
基金
加拿大健康研究院;
关键词
diabetes mellitus; financial incentive; physician remuneration; primary care reform; quality of care; CHRONIC DISEASE MANAGEMENT; PERFORMANCE PROGRAM; PROPENSITY SCORE; OF-CARE; PAY; ONTARIO; MODELS; PREVALENCE; MORTALITY; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcjd.2020.09.002
中图分类号
R5 [内科学];
学科分类号
1002 ; 100201 ;
摘要
Objectives: In the middle to late 2000s, many family physicians switched from a Family Health Group (FHG; a blended fee-for-service model) to a Family Health Organization (FHO; a blended capitation model) in Ontario, Canada. The evidence on the link between physician remuneration schemes and quality of diabetes care is mixed in the literature. We examined whether physicians who switched from the FHG to FHO model provided better care for individuals living with diabetes relative to those who remained in the FHG model. Methods: Using longitudinal health administrative data from 2006 to 2016, we investigated the impact of physicians switching from FHG to FHO on 8 quality indicators related to diabetes care. Because FHO physicians are likely to be systematically different from FHGs, we employed propensity-score-based inverse probability-weighted fixed-effects regression models. All analyses were conducted at the physician level. Results: We found that FHO physicians were more likely to provide glycated hemoglobin testing by 2.75% (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.89% to 3.60%), lipid assessment by 2.76% (CI, 1.95% to 3.57%), nephropathy screening by 1.08% (95% CI, 0.51% to 1.66%) and statin prescription by 1.08% (95% CI, 0.51% to 1.66%). Patients under FHOs had a lower estimated risk of mortality by 0.0124% (95% CI, 0.0123% to 0.0126%) per physician per year. However, FHG and FHO physicians were similar for annual eye examination, prescription of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors (or angiotensin II receptor blockers) and patients' risk of avoidable diabetes-related hospitalizations. Conclusions: Compared with blended fee-for-service, blended capitation payment is associated with a small, but statistically significant, improvement in some aspects of diabetes care. (c) 2020 Canadian Diabetes Association.
引用
收藏
页码:261 / +
页数:19
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