UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

被引:3
|
作者
Castren, Olli [1 ]
Takalo, Tuomas [2 ,3 ]
Wood, Geoffrey [4 ]
机构
[1] European Cent Bank, DG Econ, Frankfurt, Germany
[2] Univ Jyvaskyla, Bank Finland, SF-40351 Jyvaskyla, Finland
[3] Univ Jyvaskyla, Sch Business & Econ, SF-40351 Jyvaskyla, Finland
[4] City Univ, Cass Business Sch, Bangor, Gwynedd, Wales
关键词
LINEAR INFLATION CONTRACTS; CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANKS; MONETARY-POLICY; CURRENCY CRISES; POSITIVE THEORY; CREDIBILITY; FLEXIBILITY; EQUILIBRIA; COMMITMENT; TARGETS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9485.2009.00508.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two-sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to 'busts' than 'booms'. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.
引用
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页码:85 / 102
页数:18
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