Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge

被引：33
|
作者：
d'Aspremont, C [1 ]
Bhattacharya, S
Gérard-Varet, LA
机构：
[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium
[2] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
[3] CEPR, London, England
来源：
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 2000年 / 67卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1111/1467-937X.00130
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the "amount of knowledge disclosed", by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.
引用
收藏
页码：255 / 271
页数：17
相关论文
共 50 条
12345