Insider Sales under the Threat of Short Sellers: New Hypothesis and New Tests

被引:13
|
作者
Wang, Kemin [1 ]
Wang, Rencheng [2 ]
Wei, K. C. John [3 ]
Zhang, Bohui [4 ,5 ]
Zhou, Yi [1 ]
机构
[1] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[2] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Accountancy, Singapore, Singapore
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[4] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Sch Management & Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[5] Shenzhen Finance Inst, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2022年 / 97卷 / 02期
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
regulation SHO; short selling; insider trading; disciplining hypothesis; crowding-out hypothesis; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LITIGATION; EARNINGS; INFORMATION; MARKET; STOCK; PRICE; MANAGEMENT; REPUTATION; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.2308/TAR-2018-0196
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using the Regulation SHO program as a quasi-experiment, we document that the threat of short selling has a negative effect on the volume of opportunistic insider selling and a positive effect on its profitability for each transaction. These effects are stronger among firms with higher litigation risk, greater media coverage, and executives who have more of their firms' stock-related holdings. We further find robust evidence when we extend the analyses to short selling deregulations in the Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges. Overall, our findings suggest that short sellers play a disciplinary role in opportunistic insider selling.
引用
收藏
页码:427 / 451
页数:25
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