Fiscal decentralization, regional disparity, and the role of corruption
被引:2
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作者:
Nirola, Nupur
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Technol Univ, VIT AP Sch Business, Vellore Inst, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh, IndiaTechnol Univ, VIT AP Sch Business, Vellore Inst, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh, India
Nirola, Nupur
[1
]
Sahu, Sohini
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机构:
Indian Inst Technol, Dept Econ Sci, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, IndiaTechnol Univ, VIT AP Sch Business, Vellore Inst, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh, India
Sahu, Sohini
[2
]
Choudhury, Atrayee
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Indian Inst Technol, Dept Econ Sci, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, IndiaTechnol Univ, VIT AP Sch Business, Vellore Inst, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh, India
Choudhury, Atrayee
[2
]
机构:
[1] Technol Univ, VIT AP Sch Business, Vellore Inst, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh, India
[2] Indian Inst Technol, Dept Econ Sci, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India
In this study, we examine how efforts taken by states to combat corruption act as a mediator in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional income disparities. Fiscal decentralization may affect regional disparities via access to funding, but corruption could limit the ability to efficiently transfer fiscal resources. India is one of the most decentralized nations of the world and also exhibits high regional disparities. Under this scenario, we estimate whether institutions, in the form of anti-corruption efforts by the states, interact with fiscal decentralization and affect divergence across states of India. We find that fiscal decentralization reduces the disparity across states, and the effect of fiscal decentralization is stronger under efforts to control corruption by state vigilance bodies. The results are robust across different specifications of fiscal decentralization and alternate estimation methods accounting for endogeneity. From the policy perspective, in order to harness the potential benefits of decentralization to reduce regional income disparities, governments should focus on improving the quality of institutions through control on corruption at the sub-national level.
机构:
Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, NetherlandsTilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
Ligthart, Jenny E.
van Oudheusden, Peter
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Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
World Bank, Finance & Private Sect Dev Res Grp, Washington, DC 20433 USATilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
机构:
Department of Economics, Universidad del Valle, CaliDepartment of Economics, Universidad del Valle, Cali
Fernández-Marín J.C.
de Oliveira N.S.M.N.
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Department of Economics, Regional and Environmental Economics Research Group – GERA/Universidad del Valle, CaliDepartment of Economics, Universidad del Valle, Cali
de Oliveira N.S.M.N.
Mourao P.
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Department of Economics & NIPE, University of Minho, BragaDepartment of Economics, Universidad del Valle, Cali
机构:
Waseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Tokyo, Japan
Indonesia Minist Finance, Directorate Gen Taxes, Jakarta, IndonesiaWaseda Univ, Grad Sch Econ, Tokyo, Japan