机构:
WZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, GermanyWZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
Fries, Tilman
[1
]
Gneezy, Uri
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机构:
Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
Univ Amsterdam, CREED, Amsterdam, NetherlandsWZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
Gneezy, Uri
[2
,3
]
Kajackaite, Agne
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机构:
WZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, GermanyWZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
Kajackaite, Agne
[1
]
Parra, Daniel
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机构:
WZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, GermanyWZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
Parra, Daniel
[1
]
机构:
[1] WZB Berlin Social Sci Ctr, D-10785 Berlin, Germany
[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Rady Sch Management, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA
Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.