The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment

被引:176
|
作者
Younga, Liane [1 ,2 ]
Saxe, Rebecca [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] MIT, Dept Brain & Cognit Sci, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
morality; theory of mind; belief attribution; fMRI; temporoparietal junction; precuneus; medial prefrontal cortex;
D O I
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.01.057
中图分类号
Q189 [神经科学];
学科分类号
071006 ;
摘要
Moral judgment in the mature state depends on "theory of mind", or the capacity to attribute mental states (e. g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) to moral agents. The current study uses functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the cognitive processes for belief attribution in moral judgment. Participants read vignettes in a 2 x 2 x 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome, based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome or the neutral outcome; presentation of belief information either preceded or followed outcome information. In each case, participants judged the moral permissibility of the action. The results indicate that while the medial prefrontal cortex is recruited for processing belief valence, the temporo-parietal junction and precuneus are recruited for processing beliefs in moral judgment via two distinct component processes: (1) encoding beliefs and (2) integrating beliefs with other relevant features of the action (e. g., the outcome) for moral judgment. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:1912 / 1920
页数:9
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