A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents

被引：120
|
作者：
Lambrecht, Bart M. [1 ]
Myers, Stewart C. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Lancaster LA1 4YW, England
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2012年 / 67卷 / 05期
关键词：
DIVIDEND POLICY; INFORMATION-CONTENT; CONSUMPTION; INVESTMENT; EARNINGS; AGENCY; INCOME; DEBT; DETERMINANTS; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01772.x
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintners (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.
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页码：1761 / 1810
页数：50
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