Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device

被引:202
|
作者
Padilla, AJ
Pagano, M
机构
[1] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England
[2] CEMFI, Madrid, Spain
[3] Univ Salerno, CSEF, I-84100 Salerno, Italy
关键词
information sharing; credit markets; incentives;
D O I
10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00055-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Creditors often share information about their customers' credit records. Besides helping them to spot bad risks, this acts as a disciplinary device. If creditors are known to inform one another of defaults, borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders. This increases their incentive to perform. However, sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect: borrowers' incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information. In some instances, by 'fine-tuning' the type and accuracy of the information shared, lenders can raise borrowers' incentives to their first-best level. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D82; G21.
引用
收藏
页码:1951 / 1980
页数:30
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