On the Maneuvers Operational Response for NASA's Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) Mission

The Soil-Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) spacecraft requires various kinds of in-orbit maneuvers over the course of its three-year mission. The types of maneuvers include pre-planned commissioning maneuvers to reach its science orbit, regularly executed orbit maintenance maneuvers to overcome drag and other nominally occurring phenomena, as well as (the possibility of) collision avoidance maneuvers. The architecture of the spacecraft - in terms of availability of commanding via ground assets, the inherited avionics' ability to sequence and execute commands, and the capability of available subsystems able to carry out maneuvers - was well defined early in the development of the spacecraft and mission, well before the operational plan for responding to maneuver requests was cemented. [2] The systems engineering challenge became: how to accommodate all three types of maneuvers in the confines of this well-defined architecture. This paper will describe how the operations team on SMAP successfully met this challenge. Specifically, it will dive into the three pronged approach that SMAP developed to handle each type of maneuver described above - to meet the timeliness requirements leveraged on the operations team to execute said maneuvers, while continuing to fit within the allotted staffing profile during nominal operations. Defining this paradigm to fit the mission's architecture meant re-defining the original paradigm, (planned maneuvers being thought of separately than collision avoidance maneuvers), and re-classifying all responses to maneuver requests as variations and permutations of a singular operational response to a maneuver request. This paper will also describe the tools that were created to simplify the human interface and automate as much of the response as was possible. Finally, this paper will describe, at a very high level, some of the problems encountered and lessons learned by the operations team when this process was executed the first four times during the first ninety days of operations. Though the architecture of the operations team's response to maneuver requests will never be repeated exactly, the flexibility that was inserted via redefining the scope of the problem and by redefining the human interfaces should influence future projects' architectures earlier in their development -in the hopes that said influence will save time and money in the future.