Institutional design and the European union's democratic deficit

Proposals of institutional design are presented in the text in an attempt to solve the problem of the European Union's democratic deficit. The parliamentary, post-parliamentary and presidentialist strategies are analysed. The parliamentary strategy emphasises the democratic function of the national parliaments of the member states in European decision-making processes. It analyses their attempt to strengthen their legitimacy function through special committees for European issues. The post-parliamentary strategy supports direct coordination of interests between the European Commission and corporative interest associations. It is deemed that corporative and lobby networks, although contributing to efficient decision-making, cannot replace the role of the parliament. They do not have democratic legitimacy and are not subject to democratic control. Presidentialist legitimacy strategies through their proposal of direct election of the president of the European Commission on the one hand are moving towards increasing democratic legitimacy of the Union, but on the other hand are neglecting the imminent principle of consensus. The European Parliament remains the only place where there is an attempt to establish the general interest of the European Union's citizens. Thus, in addition to European political parties, it has a decisive role in establishing democratic legitimacy. It is concluded that the problem of a deficient democratic legitimacy of the European Union cannot be solved without establishing the European public and politicising the decision-making process.