Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication

被引:43
|
作者
Lippert, Steffen [1 ,2 ]
Spagnolo, Giancarlo [3 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Massey Univ, Sch Econ & Finance Albany, N Shore Mail Ctr, Auckland 0745, New Zealand
[2] Univ Auckland, Ctr Math Social Sci, Auckland 1, New Zealand
[3] Univ Roma Tor Vergata, Dept Econ & Inst, I-00133 Rome, Italy
[4] Stockholm Sch Econ, SITE, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
[5] EIEF, Rome, Italy
关键词
Collusion; Communication; Community enforcement; Contagion; Cooperation; Multimarket contact; Private monitoring; Relational contracts; Repeated games; Reputation; Rumors; Social capital; Social collateral; Social networks; Soft information; Trust; SOCIAL NORMS; MULTIMARKET CONTACT; REPEATED GAMES; COOPERATION; TRUST;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study networks of relations - groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships - exploring equilibrium conditions under different network configurations and information structures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can flow, and the value of a network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the information and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why network closure is important; why stable subnetworks may inhibit more valuable larger networks; and why information flows and action choices cannot be analyzed separately. Contagion strategies are suboptimal here, as they inhibit information transmission, delaying punishments. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:202 / 217
页数:16
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