A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels

被引:2
|
作者
Goncalves, Ricardo [1 ,2 ]
Ray, Indrajit [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, Catolica Porto Business Sch, Rua Diogo Botelho 1327, P-4169005 Porto, Portugal
[2] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, CEGE, Rua Diogo Botelho 1327, P-4169005 Porto, Portugal
[3] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Econ Sect, Colum Dr, Cardiff CF10 3EU, S Glam, Wales
关键词
Japanese-English auctions; Wallet game; Discrete bids; ENGLISH AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.032
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
It is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result. (C) 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:177 / 179
页数:3
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