Using restructured electricity supply industries to understand oligopoly industry outcomes

被引:7
|
作者
Wolak, Frank A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Program Energy & Sustainable Dev, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Electricity market design; Electricity auction design; Market performance measurement; Diagnosing market power; DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS; MARKET; MERGERS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jup.2010.09.002
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
This paper argues that many determinants of generic oligopoly market outcomes can be studied in bid-based wholesale electricity markets under much weaker assumptions than in other oligopoly industries because of their rich data, regulatory history, and clearly specified market rules. These methods are compared to those used in existing studies of oligopolistic industries where the best data available are market-clearing prices and quantities and demand and cost shifters. The extent to which the methods used in bid-based wholesale electricity markets generalize conventional methods is explained in detail and major applications of these techniques are summarized. Lessons from the study of wholesale electricity markets for the monitoring and design of other oligopolistic markets are also discussed. (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:227 / 246
页数:20
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