Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance

被引：1

作者：

Shimoji, Makoto ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 2017年 / 21卷 / 04期

关键词：

Discrete private-value auctions; Revenue comparison; Weak dominance; ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS; 1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS; WINNERS CURSE; EQUILIBRIUM; UNIQUENESS; DESIGN; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-017-0202-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the "virtual" revenue equivalence.

引用

下载

页码：231 / 252

页数：22

共 17 条

[1] Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance
Makoto Shimoji
Review of Economic Design, 2017, 21 : 231 - 252
[2] On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions
Robles, Jack
Shimoji, Makoto
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2012, 12 (01):
[3] Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
Quint, Daniel
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2008, 100 (03) : 432 - 434
[4] Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions
Dekel, E
Wolinsky, A
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2003, 43 (02) : 175 - 188
[5] Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
Cheng, Harrison H.
Tan, Guofu
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2010, 45 (1-2) : 253 - 290
[6] Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
McGee, Peter
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 82 : 312 - 326
[7] Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
Harrison H. Cheng
Guofu Tan
Economic Theory, 2010, 45 : 253 - 290
[8] Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
Tan, Xu
Xing, Yiqing
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2011, 111 (01) : 99 - 103
[9] Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
Goeree, JK
Holt, CA
Palfrey, TR
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, 104 (01) : 247 - 272
[10] Releasing information in private-value second-price auctions
Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2018, 65 (03) : 781 - 817

← 1 2 →