Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption

被引：3
|
作者：
Ugol'nitskii, G. A. [1 ]
Usov, A. B. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Southern Fed Univ, Rostov Na Donu, Russia
来源：
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEMS SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL | 2020年 / 59卷 / 01期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
SYSTEMS;
D O I：
10.1134/S1064230720010128
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
Dynamic game-theoretic models of fighting against the corrupt behavior of subjects in the models for coordinating private and public interests are considered. The case of the economic impact of an upper-level subject on a lower-level subjects is investigated. An algorithm for finding equilibria in the case of impulsion is described. Examples of calculations for various sets of input data are presented. A meaningful interpretation of the results is discussed.
引用
收藏
页码：39 / 48
页数：10
相关论文
共 50 条
12345