Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

被引：11
|
作者：
Renou, Ludovic [1 ]
Schlag, Karl H. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Leicester, Dept Econ, Leicester LE1 7RH, Leics, England
[2] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona, Spain
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2011年 / 71卷 / 02期
关键词：
Implementation; Minimax regret; Maskin monotonicity; NASH IMPLEMENTATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of epsilon-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in epsilon-minimax regret equilibrium for all epsilon is an element of [0, 1). (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：527 / 533
页数：7
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