Zero-sum games for continuous-time Markov chains with unbounded transition and average payoff rates
被引:32
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作者:
Guo, XP
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机构:
Zhongshan Univ, Sch Math & Computat Sci, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R ChinaZhongshan Univ, Sch Math & Computat Sci, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
Guo, XP
[1
]
Hernández-Lerma, O
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机构:Zhongshan Univ, Sch Math & Computat Sci, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
Hernández-Lerma, O
机构:
[1] Zhongshan Univ, Sch Math & Computat Sci, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
zero-sum game;
controlled Q-process;
average payoff criterion;
pairs of optimal stationary strategies;
martingale characterization;
D O I:
10.1017/S0021900200019331
中图分类号:
O21 [概率论与数理统计];
C8 [统计学];
学科分类号:
020208 ;
070103 ;
0714 ;
摘要:
This paper is a first study of two-person zero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by given transition rates, with an average payoff criterion. The transition rates are allowed to be unbounded, and the payoff rates may have neither upper nor lower bounds. In the spirit of the 'drift and monotonicity' conditions for continuous-time Markov processes, we give conditions on the controlled system's primitive data under which the existence of the value of the game and a pair of strong optimal stationary strategies is ensured by using the Shapley equations. Also, we present a 'martingale characterization' of a pair of strong optimal stationary strategies. Our results are illustrated with a binh-and-death game.
机构:
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Sch Sci, Shenzhen, Peoples R ChinaSun Yat Sen Univ, Sch Sci, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
Guo, Xin
Huang, Yonghui
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机构:
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Sch Math, Guangzhou 510275, Peoples R China
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Guangdong Prov Key Lab Computat Sci, Guangzhou, Peoples R ChinaSun Yat Sen Univ, Sch Sci, Shenzhen, Peoples R China