Levinas's Philosophy of Perception

被引:1
|
作者
Bower, Matt E. M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Texas State Univ, San Marcos, TX 78666 USA
来源
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2017年 / 55卷 / 04期
关键词
INTENTIONALITY; HUSSERL;
D O I
10.1111/sjp.12260
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how it fits in among presently available views about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, as a form of naive realism.
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页码:383 / 414
页数:32
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