LOCATION CHOICES UNDER STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS

被引:30
|
作者
Alcacer, Juan [1 ]
Dezso, Cristian [2 ]
Zhao, Minyuan [3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Strategy Unit, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, Robert H Smith Sch Business, Logist Business & Publ Policy Dept, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] Univ Michigan, Ross Sch Business, Strategy Dept, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
location strategies; game theory; firm heterogeneity; FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT; INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION; JAPANESE FIRMS; AGGLOMERATION; EXTERNALITIES; CAPABILITIES; ENVIRONMENT; IMITATION; ENTRY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1002/smj.2214
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore a fundamental aspect of firms' location choices largely overlooked in the literature: strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms' profits. Strategic interaction also impacts location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher-value markets. However, when learning is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower-value to higher-value markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 215
页数:19
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