Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems

被引:2
|
作者
Pech, Gerald [1 ]
机构
[1] KIMEP, Dept Econ, Alma Ata 050010, Kazakhstan
关键词
COALITIONS; INCOME;
D O I
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We establish coalitional stable party structures of a party formation game in an elected assembly. Farsighted political players can commit to form parties and to vote on policies according to the party position which is determined by intra-party majority rule. Parties may form governments and block proposals by a randomly selected member of the government. If the government recognition rule allows for the formation of multiparty governments, the median parliamentarian either realizes her ideal point or a policy lottery which she strictly prefers to the status quo. This outcome is enforced by the threat of forming a moderating centre party. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:14 / 22
页数:9
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