Trust and trustworthiness under information asymmetry and ambiguity

被引:11
|
作者
Clots-Figueras, Irma [1 ]
Gonzalez, Roberto Hernan [2 ]
Kujal, Praveen [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, Calle Madrid 126, Madrid 28903, Spain
[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Business, Jubilee Campus South Bldg, Nottingham NG8 1BB, England
[3] Middlesex Univ, Sch Business, Dept Econ, London NW4 4BT, England
关键词
Investment game; Uncertainty; Ambiguity; Trust; Trustworthiness; RECIPROCITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We introduce uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game. In the uncertainty treatment, investors are informed that the return of the investment is drawn from a publicly known distribution function. In the ambiguity treatment, investors are not informed about the distribution function. We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:168 / 170
页数:3
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